知识产权司法保护对于企业管理层短视行为的抑制性研究
西南政法大学, 商学院, 重庆 401120
| 摘 要： | 当前，部分管理层存在更关注短期财务指标、缺乏对长期市场趋势的深入研究等短视现状。在此现状下，会因注重眼前利益而忽视长期战略规划，错过机遇、引发短视，损害企业声誉和竞争力，使企业陷入发展困境。现有文献强调了提升企业能力和加强外部监管对企业抑制管理层短视行为中的作用，然而忽视了制度层面的法律规制对此类行为的影响。基于交易成本理论的视角，本文提出了设立知识产权法院，作为一种强化知识产权司法的制度安排，能有效抑制管理层短视行为。本文以2008至2022年中国深沪A股上市公司为研究对象，以2014年知识产权法院设立作为外生冲击事件，采用双重差分（DID）模型实证检验了加强知识产权司法保护对管理层短视行为的影响。研究结果显示，知识产权司法保护能够有效抑制管理者短视的行为。机制分析发现，知识产权司法保护能够通过缓解企业外部融资约束和提升政府监管来抑制管理层短视行为。异质性分析进一步发现，知识产权司法保护对国有企业的和大规模企业的管理者短视具有更加显著的抑制作用。本文的研究成果为公司治理管理层短视提供一定的理论和实践研究价值。 |
| 关 键 词： | 知识产权司法保护; 管理层短视; 行业监管压力; 外部融资约束; DID双重差分模型 |
| DOI： | 10.57237/j.ssrf.2025.05.002 |
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收稿日期: 2025-09-08
接受日期: 2025-10-19
在线出版日期: 2025-11-12
A Study on the Inhibitory Effect of the Judicial Protection of Intellectual Property on Corporate Short-sighted Managerial Behavior
Business School, Southwest University of Political Science and Law, Chongqing 401120, China
| Abstract: | At present, some corporate management teams exhibit short-sighted tendencies. They focus on short-term financial indicators rather than conducting in-depth research on long-term market trends. However, such an emphasis on immediate gains can lead to neglect of long-term strategic planning, missed opportunities, short-sightedness, damage to corporate reputation and competitiveness, and ultimately, developmental difficulties for their corporations. Previous studies emphasize the role of enhancing corporate capabilities and strengthening external supervision in curbing short-sighted managerial behavior, yet overlook the impact of institutional-level legal regulations on such behavior. From the perspective of transaction cost theory, this paper proposes establishing intellectual property courts as an institutional arrangement to strengthen the intellectual property judiciary, which may effectively inhibit short-sighted managerial behavior. This paper examines A-share listed corporations in Shenzhen and Shanghai from 2008 to 2022. The authors take the establishment of intellectual property courts in 2014 as an exogenous shock and employ a Difference-in-Differences (DID) model to empirically test the impact of strengthened judicial protection of intellectual property on corporate short-sighted managerial behavior. The results show that judicial protection of intellectual property can effectively deter short-sighted managerial behavior. Mechanism analysis reveals that judicial protection of intellectual property can curb short-sighted managerial behavior by alleviating external financing constraints and enhancing government supervision. Heterogeneity analysis further indicates that judicial protection of intellectual property can significantly inhibit short-sighted managerial behavior in state-owned and large-scale corporations. The findings of this study provide theoretical and practical value for corporate governance in addressing short-sighted managerial behavior. |
| Keywords: | Judicial Protection of Intellectual Property; Short-Sighted Managerial Behavior; Industry Regulatory Pressure; External Financing Constraints; DID Model |
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